

Post-privatization of electricity industry in Nigeria: the issues and challenges of power distribution

Kelechukwu Charles **Obi**, ¹Joel Ifeanyi **Ezugwu**, ²Chima, J. **Korieh**,
²Kenneth Chinedu **Asogwa** & ³Aaron Adibe **Agbo***

University of Nigeria, Nsukka

¹Department of Political Science,

²Institute of African Studies

³Department of Psychology

*Corresponding author: aaron.adibe@unn.edu.ng

Abstract

Extant studies on the post-privatization performance of Nigeria's electricity industry have disproportionately focused on the flaws of the privatization process, regulatory inconsistencies, and systemic corruption as causal factors responsible for the poor performance of the industry. The studies tend to downplay the importance of politically motivated regulatory violations as constituting an explanatory variable. This study takes advantage of this epistemic gap to examine how the ruling elites have captured and abused the electricity regulatory frameworks in Nigeria and their implications for the overall performance of the electricity sector. A combined sources of data collection and a qualitative descriptive analytical method were used. The political capture theoretical approach is applied in the study to dissect the negative impact of political violation of the Nigeria's electricity industry from three interrelated regulatory perspectives, namely (1) shaping and infraction of the cost-reflective tariff, (2) breakdown of long term domestic and foreign investment and liquidity predicament, and (3) corrupt tariff regime, shadow economy, poor revenue generation and service delivery. The study concludes that these underlying regulatory issues and related challenges are implicated

in the post-privatization malfunctionings of Nigeria's electricity sector. Tackling these regulatory nuances and improving on electricity service delivery in Nigeria portends strong political will in the complete privatization of the electricity industry, provision of sovereign guarantees, and the maintenance of an impartial regulatory ecosystem.

Keywords: Political capture; post-privatisation; electricity industry; regulation; electricity market; cost-reflective tariff

Introduction

The privatization of Nigeria's electricity industry in 2013 was intended to transform the sector into a more efficient, customer-focused system. The government unbundled the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) into generating companies (Gencos), transmission (managed by the Transmission Company of Nigeria, TCN), and distribution companies (Discos). (Manjo, 2024). While generation and distribution were privatized, transmission remained under government control. The expectation was that private investment would modernize infrastructure, improve service delivery, and expand access to electricity. However, more than a decade later, the distribution segment, which is the final link between electricity supply and consumers, continues to face severe challenges. The distribution segment, comprising transmission interfaces,

distribution companies (Discos), metering, billing, and customer service, has become the most visible bottleneck in the sector (Kemabonta & Kabalan, 2018). It forms part of Nigeria's broader experience with privatization, which has, in practice, unfolded as a recurring cycle of crises, despite the initial widespread expectation that the policy would remedy public-sector inefficiencies (Ikeanyibe, 2020). The current study draws the bulk of its data from the Nigerian Electricity Supply Industry (NESI), whose poor performance has led to an exponential increase in calls for a reversal of privatization, share dilution, receivership, or outright re-privatization (Aina, 2025; Jeremiah, 2020). Nigeria's former Senate President, Ahmed Lawan, has had a course to assert that "...it's time for Nigeria to consider reversing the privatization of the power sector or they should just cancel the entire privatization process completely" during the deliberation of a motion on

Nigeria's power sector recovery plan (Jeremiah, 2020, p.1). Obviously, electricity production in Nigeria was drastically the lowest in the world (Okonjo-Iweala, 2012) before its partial privatization on 30 September 2013. The per capita energy consumption was ranked at 106.21KWh, far behind Gabon (900.00 kWh), Ghana (283.65 kWh), Cameroon (176.01KWh), and Kenya (124.68 kWh) (Anyanrouh cited in IseOlorunkanmi, 2014). Reforms in the NESI became extremely critical, culminating in the authorities enacting the National Electric Power Policy (NEPP) in 2001 and the Electricity Power Sector Reform Act (EPSRA) of 2005 (now the Electricity Act, 2023)(UNCTAD, 2023).

Under the EPSRA , the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) was vertically unbundled into three replacement business segments: the sole Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN), 11 distribution companies (DisCos), and 6 generation companies (GenCos) (Obi & Herbert, 2016). The new investors were obliged by the Act to acquire a minimum of 60 percent of the shares of each successor company, while the Federal Government (FG) divested its composite equity shares in GenCos and DisCos to a minimum of

40 percent (Obiorji & Iwuoha, 2021). TCN was outsourced under FG ownership to Manitoba International (Ikeanyibe, 2020).This was meant to develop a sustainable electricity market that would increase management efficiency and draw private investment (Ogunleye, 2017; Esiedesa, 2023). With private investment and management, electricity generation was expected to increase to 13,000 megawatts (MW) in 2015 and 40,000 MW in 2020 (Ogunleye, 2017). Subsequently, the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) was created and empowered to license and regulate companies in the electricity value chains (Amadi, 2019). According the Electricity Act (2023), the kernel is to guarantee a regular, affordable and improved electricity supply by enforcing sectoral adherence to operational principles and market rules in the post-privatization era. Post-privatization generally explains the period that follows privatization. It is defined by the private control of a business or company previously owned by the state, with the primary goals of efficiency and profit.

Apparently, government reforms in revamping the NESI have recorded some gains, such as the preliminary private

investment proceeds of \$2.53 billion, an increase in grid capacity from 3,000 MW to 4,000 MW, a generation capacity increase from 4,214.32 MW to 8,145 MW, and an increase in transmission capacity from 5000 MW to 8100 MW (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2018; Addeh, 2022). Nevertheless, this statistics foreshadow a negligible result when contrasted with the set objectives. As aptly noted by the Nigeria's president, Bola Ahmed Tinubu:

10 years on, I believe it is fair to say that the objectives of power sector privatization have, by and large, not been met. Over 90 million Nigerians lack access to electricity. The national grid only serves about 15 percent of the country' demand. This has left households and factories to rely on expensive self-generating, which supplies a staggering 40% of the country's demand(cited in Esiedesa, 2023, p.1).

With an estimated population of 237,527,782, Nigeria currently struggles to deliver 5,000 megawatts to the national grid, while the regional counterparts with lesser populations, South Africa (64,747,319) and Egypt

(118,365,995), comparatively deliver 58,095MW and 59,093MW, respectively (Punch 2025; Worldometer, 2025). Also, the country is the poorest in the world on power supply to businesses, resulting in an average economic loss of \$26 billion annually (World Bank cited in Thisday, 2024).

More fundamental to NESI's appalling performance after privatization is a politically-induced capture of the sector, defined by the shaping and infraction of the cost-reflective tariff for primitive benefits (Akanonu, 2019; Sipasi, 2018). Cost-reflective tariffs in the electricity sector are designed to align consumer charges with the actual cost of generating, transmitting, and distributing power. Their "shaping" refers to how regulators structure tariffs to balance affordability and sustainability, while "infraction" refers to distortions such as political interference that prevent tariffs from reflecting true costs, undermining sector viability (Rhys, 2018). The cost-reflective tariff or the Multi-Year Tariff Order (MYTO) was established and designed in July 2008 to provide adequate funding and sustainability for electricity services (Nigerian Energy Support Programme,

2015). It aimed at encapsulating all electricity expenses inside the consumers' tariff to guarantee the electricity sector's effective self-sustainability, obviating the need for government bailouts or subsidies (NERC, 2011). This would safeguard complete cost recovery for investors and maintain industry funding and investment confidence (Sipasi, 2018; Ogunleye, 2017; Nwangwu 2019; Akanonu, 2019). Nevertheless, the ruling elite ostensibly contrived and violated the electricity cost-reflective tariff to gain political advantage, significantly entrenching several regulatory obstacles in Nigeria's electricity market such as electricity pricing uncertainty and difficulty in cost recovery by the investors, particularly in the distribution value chain (Sipasi, 2018; Amadi, 2019; Nwangwu, 2019; Akanonu, 2019). This has since led to the breakdown of long term domestic and foreign investment, liquidity predicament and cyclic indebtedness in the overall electricity value chains (Jeremiah, 2022; Nwangwu, 2019; Jeremiah, 2024; Akpan et. Al., 2024; George, 2024).

Perhaps more fundamental in the post-privatization regulatory tight spot of the Nigeria's electricity industry has been a

corrupt tariff regime, shadow economy, poor revenue generation, and service delivery. DisCos have been impenitently in the throes of unchecked, corrupt-ridden market behaviours, characterized by poor metering of electricity consumers and estimated tariff billing (Jeremiah, 2022; Nwangwu, 2019; Jeremiah, 2024; Akpan et al, 2024; George, 2024). In response, many businesses and households have stopped grumbling and have been looking for ever-more-dramatic ways to cut costs. These are evidenced in a flourishing shadow economy where individuals and businesses attempt to obtain electricity outside of the established channels in an effort to save money at the expense of safety and legality (George,2024). This has further deepened the liquidity and service delivery crisis of the DisCos (Aina, 2025). In spite of the government policy, subsidy and funding interventions, and aid from donor agencies and countries, Nigeria's electricity distress has persisted (Nnodim, 2022; George, 2024; Jaiyeola, 2024). This has raised backlashes and real doubt on the profitability of the privatization efforts in NESI.

Extant studies have mainly focused on policy and regulatory inconsistencies,

cronyism, flawed privatisation processes as well as institutional and systemic corruption (e.g., Esan et al., 2024; Olanrele, 2024; Babatunde et al., 2023; Zakari & Ibeme, 2023; Olise et al., 2022; Obiorji & Iwuoha, 2021; Amadi, 2019; Albert et al., 2021; Ogunleye, 2017; Estrin & Pelletier, 2018; Ikeanyibe, 2020; Adamu & IorhenAkuvam, 2025). However, the shaping and infraction of cost-reflective tariffs by the ruling elite has received little scholarly attention. Also, the extant studies have hardly established a link between the contravention of market tools and the breakdown of long-term domestic and foreign investment, liquidity crisis, corrupt tariff regime, shadow economy, poor revenue generation, cyclic indebtedness, and inefficiency of service delivery in the electricity sector. The current study exploits these gaps to interrogate the issues and challenges of power distribution in Nigeria in the post-privatization era of the electricity industry in the country.

Privatization and deregulation in the electricity sector, government policy efforts, and challenges

Privatization refers to the transfer of assets and responsibilities from the public

sector to private actors. It involves creating conditions that enable private enterprises to thrive, such as liberalizing the economy and encouraging private investors to deliver goods and services previously financed by the state (Omenma, 2003). As a market-led economic reform, it prioritizes reducing the extent of government participation and interference in economic activities (UNO Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2007). As an economic ideology, its manifestation in domestic policy formulation consists of deregulation, privatization, and cuts in public spending. The ideology underpinning privatization and its resurgence in contemporary economies is best described as neoliberalism. Rooted in the Washington Consensus of 1989, neoliberalism emphasizes privatization, commercialization, fiscal discipline, reduced public spending (particularly through broad-based subsidies for pro-growth and pro-poor services), tax reform through broadening the tax base and adjusting marginal rates, trade liberalization, deregulation to remove barriers to market entry and competition, and legal safeguards for property rights (Umezurike, 2012; Davies, 2014). In the 1980s, policy prescriptions for Africa

were shaped by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, whose analyses urged governments to eliminate budget deficits, reduce inflation, liberalize trade, and unleash market forces (UNO Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2007). These donor agencies argued that the activities of states were the principal causes of Africa's economic decline, citing corruption, authoritarianism, and weak administrative capacity (Muriisa, 2005). Consequently, they recommended stripping back the state's role in the economy, contending that only market-led reforms could deliver sustainable progress (Mbabazi & Taylor, 2005).

The privatization process in Nigeria was constitutionalised following the pronouncement of the Privatization and Commercialization Decree No. 25 of October 1988 (Obiorji & Iwuoha, 2021). This was focused on restructuring the economy by lessening the share of wasteful investments in the public utilities (Amadi, 2019). However, privatization did not take immediate shape in the NESI until September 2000, when the Electric Power Reform Implementation Committee (EPIC) was constituted (Nwadioke, 2012). This

process culminated in the drafting of the National Electric Power Policy (NEPP) in 2001 (Nwadioke, 2012) followed by the phased implementation of power sector reforms (Nigerian Energy Support Programme, 2015). In its Pre-Transition Stage, NEPP recommended the unbundling of the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), the creation of a market regulator, privatization of the sector, and the establishment of market trading designs, rules, codes, and processes (Nwadioke, 2012). These recommendations informed the formulation of the Electric Power Reform Bill (EPRB), which was approved by the Federal Executive Council in April 2001 (Obiorji & Iwuoha, 2021). The Bill was subsequently passed by the National Assembly in February 2005 and signed into law as the Electric Power Sector Reform Act (EPSRA) by President Olusegun Obasanjo on 11 March 2005 (Obiorji & Iwuoha, 2021).

Under EPSRA, the NEPA's monopoly was unbundled and PHCN was created as a successor company (Obi & Herbert, 2016). A sector regulator, the NERC was subsequently created (Nigerian Energy Support Programme, 2015). Section 76 of the EPSRA empowers the NERC to license

and regulate companies in the value chains of electricity, as well as regulate electricity power tariffs using defined methodologies. The Road Map for power sector initiative was subsequently launched in August 2010 to address some of the identified challenges (IseOlorunkanmi, 2014). The initiative provided a timeline for the completion of the Pre-Transition Stage of the privatization, spanning from December 2010 to August 2013 (IseOlorunkanmi, 2014). The completion of all the independent power plants and refurbishment of the existing ones necessary to upscale available power generation capacity to 14,000 megawatts by December 2013 were also considered (Obiorji & Iwuoha, 2021). This included the power plants conceived under the

National Integrated Power Projects (NIPPs) (Nwadioke, 2012). The Road Map culminated in a competitive bidding process, the selection of successful bidders, and the handover to private investors, the electricity assets on 1 November 2013 (Nwachukwu & Eboh, 2013; IseOlorunkanmi, 2014; Sunday, 2013). The FGN retained authority over the transmission and system operation through the TCN (Nigerian Energy Support Programme, 2015). The TCN consists of a market operator division and a system division, a single control center located at Oshogbo, with the generators and transmission lines connected in a shared grid (Nigerian Energy Support Programme, 2015). Tables 1 and 2 provide fact sheets of privatised electricity value chains and key policy steps in NESI.

Table 1: Privatized Electricity Generating and Distribution Assets

Privatized Asset	Type and Year built	Owners and Acquiring Company	Cost	Installed Capacity (MW)	Location
Generating Companies					
Afam Power Plc	Thermal 1962	Mr Tony Elumelu, Mr Obinna Ufudo and Mr Adeoye Fadeyibi. Transcorp/	US\$300 million	987.2	Rivers State

		Woodrock Consortium			
Egbin Power Plc	Thermal 1985	Tope Shonubi and Tonye Cole. KEPCO Energy Resources Ltd	US\$549m for 51% plant share in 2007 and US\$670m for 19% plant share in 2013	1,320	Ogun State
Kainji/Jebba Power Plc	Hydro 1968/85	Col. Sani Bello, Alhaji Ismaila Isa and Brig. Gen Tunde Ogbeha. Mainstream Energy Solutions Ltd	US\$170 million	1,330	Niger State
Sapele Power Plc	Thermal 1978	CMEC/Eurafric Ltd	US\$201 million	1,020	Delta State
Shiroro Power Plc	Hydro 1990	Gen. Ibrahim Babangida and Engr. Olubunmi Peters. North-South Power Company Ltd	US\$111.7 million	600	Niger State
Ughelli Power Plc	Thermal 1966	Mr Tony Elumelu, Mr Obinna Ufudo and Mr Adeoye Fadeyibi. Transcorp/ Woodrock Consortium	US\$300 million	942	Delta State
Distribution Companies	-	-	-	Percentage Load Allocation	States and Areas Covered
Abuja Electricity Distribution Company (AEDC)	-	Ambassador Shehu Malami and Mr Neil Croucher. KANN Utility Consortium Company Ltd	US\$164 million	11.5%	FCT, Niger, Kogi, Nassarawa

Benin Electricity Distribution Company (BEDC)	-	Mr Victor Gbolade Osibodu and Mrs Funke Osibodu – acquired by Vigeo Power Ltd	US\$129 million	9%	Edo, Delta, Ondo, Ekiti
Eko Electricity Distribution Company (EEDC)	-	Mr Charles Momoh, Dr Tunji Olowolafe and Mr Ernest Orji. West Power and Gas Ltd	US\$135 million	11%	Lagos South
Enugu Electricity Distribution Company (EEDC)	-	Sir Emeka Offor. Inter State Electrics Ltd	US\$107.4 million	9%	Enugu, Imo, Anambra, Abia, Ebonyi
Ibadan Electricity Distribution Company (IEDC)	-	Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar, Mr Olatunde Ayeni and Dr Sola Ayandele. Integrated Energy Distribution and Marketing Ltd	US\$126.75 million	13%	Oyo, Ogun, Osun, Kwara
Ikeja Electricity Distribution Company (IEDC)	-	Mr Kola Adesina, Mr Tonye Cole and Tope Shonubi. NEDC/KEPCO Consortium	US\$134.75 million	15%	Lagos North
Jos Electricity Distribution Company (JEDC)	-	Alhaji Mohammed Ahmed. Aura Energy Ltd	US\$82 million	5.5%	Plateau, Benue, Bauchi, Gombe
Kaduna Electricity Distribution Company (KEDC)	-	Alhaji Yusuf Hamisu Abubakar	US\$102 million	8%	Kaduna, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kebbi

Kano Electricity Distribution Company (KEDC)	-	Alhaji Yusuf Hamisu Abubakar and Alhaji Umaru Mutallab. Sahelian Power (SPV) Ltd	US\$102 million	8%	Kano, Gigawa, Katsina
Port Harcourt Electricity Distribution Company (PEDC)	-	Mr Augustine Nwokocha and Governments of Bayelsa, Rivers, Cross River and Akwa Ibom States. Power Consortium Ltd	US\$124 million	6.5%	Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Rivers, Bayelsa
Yola Electricity Distribution Company Plc	-	Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar, Mr Olatunde Ayeni and Dr Sola Ayandele. Integrated Energy Distribution and Marketing Ltd	US\$44.25 million	11.5%	Adamawa, Borno, Taraba, Yobe

Note. Adapted and modified by the authors from: Nigeria Electricity Regulatory Commission (2012); TCN Monthly Energy Balance Sheet, October, 2012; Albert et al. (2021)

Table 2: Key Policy and Steps in Nigeria's Electricity Sector, 2001-2025

Date	Privatization Policy Measures
2001	Adoption of the National Electric Power Policy
2005	Electric Power Sector Reform Act was introduced; establishment of the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC); formation of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN)
2006	Unbundling of the PHCN into 18 independent companies-6 Gencos, 11 Discos and 1 TCN; ten National Integrated Power Projects (NIPP) were implemented; market operations department of the TCN was established; Rural Electrification Agency (REA) was established

2008-2009	Publication of the Multi Year Tariff Oder (MYTO); the Power Sector Reform Committee was formed
2010-2012	The Nigeria Vision 20:2020 was launched; the Presidential Action Committee on Power (PACP) and the Presidential Task Force on Power (PTFP) were established; the Roadmap for Power Sector Reform was released; the Bulk Electricity Trader (NBET) was established
2012	MYTO II was approved and released; TCN entered into a management contract with a utility and asset management company; nuclear energy Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) was signed
2013	Full privatisation of the generation and distribution subsectors; the transmission subsector was retained by Government but its management is currently under concession; improvement in hydro-electric power stations; US\$1.72bn outlay for the construction of three stations; MoUs signed for coal power partnerships
2014	Strengthening of renewable energy programmes; seven out of ten NIPP generating assets sales completed
2015	MYTO 2.1 was approved and released. Petitions by various consumer groups, evoked by electricity price increases of up to 80%, led to amendment of MYTO 2.1 and a price drop of 50%; 1st of February 2015 commencement of transitional power market, after NERC declared all Conditions Precedent listed in the market rules as satisfied
May 2015	Unbundling of TCN into an Independent System Operator (public) and a Transmission Service Provider (private) has begun. Transitional power market was established
2016	NERC directed Discos to conclude the metering of all maximum electricity customers in their network before November 2016
2017	NERC issued the Eligible Customers Regulation; FG introduced the Power Sector Recovery Programme (PSRP); the Mini-Grid Regulation was adopted by the NERC
2018	The Meter Asset Providers Regulation was approved by NERC; the Electricity Theft and Vandalization Prohibition Bill was introduced

2023	Signing and adoption of Electricity Act, 2023 that seeks to liberalize the electricity sector and empower states, companies and individuals to generate, transmit and distribute electricity
2025	Introduction of the Electricity Act Amendment Bill that seeks to overhaul the 2023 Electricity Act by addressing regulatory gaps and investment crisis

Note. Culled from Nigerian Energy Support Programme (2015); Centre for Democracy and Development (2020); UNCTAD (2023); Aina (2025)

As part of the transitional and medium stages of privatization that commenced 1 February 2015, the competition for entry into the energy market has been introduced, and contract-based procedures for electricity trading, implemented (Nigerian Energy Support Programme, 2015). This suggests that all the electricity investment arrangements are bound by contract; hence Power Purchase Agreements (PPA), Vesting

Contracts and Gas Supply Agreements have all been activated (Nigerian Energy Support Programme, 2015). Nevertheless, Nigeria's policy efforts in the NESI aimed at efficient supply of electricity have not been successful. According to Amadi (2019), Oruwari (2021), the success of the privatization has been largely determined by the cost of the assets and conclusion of transfer rather than performance improvement in the

privatized entities (Amadi, 2019; Oruwari, 2021). This has been linked to the electricity firms' huge debt obligations on the local financial market, inadequate pricing structure and poor investment in the infrastructures (Ogunleye, 2017). In contrast, Iwuoha (2018), Amadi (2019) linked the unsatisfactory performance of the privatized electricity firms to corruption, mismanagement and poor service delivery. Ogunleye (2017) identified regulatory incertitude and policy inconsistencies in the implementation of a sustainable and rule-based electricity market, but did not link these to political capture. Generally, the extant literature has failed to provide explanation on the effect of the infraction of cost-reflective tariff by the ruling elite. The perspectives explored have hardly established any link between the contravention of market tool and the breakdown of long term domestic and foreign investment, liquidity crisis,

corrupt tariff regime, shadow economy, poor revenue generation, cyclic indebtedness and inefficient service delivery in the Nigerian electricity sector. The current study derives its point of departure and significance from the above gaps in literature.

Post-privatization development of Nigeria's electricity industry: A theoretical framing

The political capture theory is adopted in this paper. Political capture explains the political economy predicaments of postcolonial and transition economies, such as Nigeria. The theory developed from the broad spectrum of state capture and regulatory capture. State capture is similar to regulatory capture, but broader in scope (David-Barrett, 2023). State capture is a type of systematic corruption that foretells the takeover of institutions and procedures by special interest or business groups (David-Barrett, 2023; Hellman, et al., 2000). Regulatory capture is predicated on the long-term domination of regulatory bodies by the regulated businesses (Stigler, 1971). In many instances of state capture and regulatory capture, the process of capture seems to be driven by political elites more than business interests, hence, the

concept of politics-led capture or political capture (David-Barrett, 2023). Political capture describes a situation in which the political class and government officials apparently shape and influence the regulations and decision-making processes of a country (Cook et al., 2004). It poses a greater risk than capture by producer groups or businesses outside the political system. This is because the businesses often lack the same level of influence over policy decisions, making them less likely to sway regulations in their favour as the political class. Conversely, political capture harbors the potentials to drastically alter laws, institutions, as well as create systemic and regulatory biases in support of private interest of the ruling class (Cook et al., 2004).

According to its proponents, such as Cook et al. (2004), Stiglitz (1998), Parker and Kirkpatrick (2003), David-Barrett (2023), political capture distorts regulatory objectives to achieve political interests. The distortion is necessary to preserve political power or safeguard impunity (David-Barrett, 2023). Under political capture, regulation is designed as a tool of self-interest within government or the ruling elite (Stiglitz, 1998). There might

not be a distinct third party; instead, the officeholders misuse their influence to direct the creation of regulatory laws and policies in ways that directly benefit them (David-Barrett, 2023). The regulation phenomenon may extend to cronyism in regulatory decision-making and even outright corruption by officials (Theobald, 1990; Craig, 2000; Duckett, 2001; Tangri & Mwenda, 2001).

Contrasting considerably with the logic of market failure and public choice theory for state regulation, political capture portends that regulatory structures are deliberately created to support and serve the interests of the ruling elite (Cook et al., 2004). Regulation is, therefore, designed to create room for "political capture and self-serving regulatory state" (Cook et al., 2004, p.13). This is more evident when the leadership of regulatory offices is clearly based on political appointment (Cook et al., 2004). Political capture creates the crisis of regulatory legitimacy and public support because of erosion of public trust in the state and regulatory apparatus (Cook et al., 2004). The likelihood of political capture is mostly fostered and sustained by information asymmetries between the regulated and the regulator, a lack of

independent media and judiciary, and a lack of educated opinion outside of government (Bradbury & Ross, 1991; Veljanovski, 1991). Political capture creates suspicion of the process and results of the regulatory system that tends to deter prospective investors (Levy & Spiller, 1996).

Political capture is more germane and apposite, among other factors, in the explanation of the regulatory dynamics and the post-privatization abysmal performance of the NESI. Because of Nigeria's postcolonial and extractive characters, opportunistic government reforms and a governance structure that prioritizes the interests of the ruling class and cronies over the general welfare have dominated the country's political economy over the years. Arguably, the neoliberal reform in the NESI was driven essentially by the palpable need to safeguard the economic interests of the ruling elite, as evidenced in its political slant in the selection of the successful bidders. Attempt at safeguarding the subterranean political interest in the industry climaxed in the creation of NERC with a deliberate political structure of the appointment and ratification of the key officials by the ruling elite. This has

ultimately led to an unfettered leverage of the regulatory body by the ruling elite. The government equity shares in the electricity value chains and subsidy regime have conflated in motivating and nurturing the political leverage. The overall impact has been distortion and contravention of the NESI's regulatory decision-making process, particularly the cost-reflective tariff. It has equally impacted deleteriously on long term domestic and foreign investment and liquidity inflows, leading to corrupt tariff regime, shadow economy, poor revenue generation, and cyclic indebtedness. This situation has apparently jeopardized the overall stability of the electricity market and efficient service delivery.

Methodology

The article employed a mixed-methods approach for data collection, incorporating documentary evidence, key informant interviews (KIIs), and observation techniques. The documentary approach enabled the researchers to evaluate a large portion of the secondary data applicable to the study. This involved the desk review and analysis of documentary evidences, including scholarly publications in reputable and impactful journals, official publications of

the FG, the NERC, institutional reports, policy briefs, magazines and newspaper editorials and commentaries. These were cross-checked with primary data collected by the researcher through focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KIIs). The field trip was conducted from 20 April to 5 August 2025 across the six (6) geopolitical zones in Nigeria. The places visited include: Abuja, Benin, Lagos, Enugu, Ibadan, Ikeja, Jos, Kaduna, Kano, Port Harcourt and Adamawa. These urban centres were chosen mainly because they are hubs of businesses and industries. The researchers used the mapping approach to create a list of targeted and purposefully selected key stakeholders/informants who can provide relevant information on NESI. This is based on their direct involvement electricity business in Nigeria, as officials of DisCos, GenCos, energy consultants and experts, researchers, electricity unions, advocacy groups etc. Also, selected were the electricity consumers, including household users, owners of micro, small, and medium-sized businesses (MSMEs), manufacturers, and industrialists. The researchers planned and carried out fifteen (15) in-depth interviews with representatives and staff members of DisCos, GenCos, and TCN

based on the mapping approach. On the other hand, ten focus group discussions (FGDs) with associations of energy consumers and manufacturers were also conducted in order to get first-hand information and knowledge. Each FGD had a maximum of 5-10 participants, forming a total of 65 persons in the 18-70 age range in each of the chosen research locations. The participants were selected from the following study areas: Abuja Municipal Council, Ovia North-East, Ikeja, Enugu North, Ibadan Municipal, Lagos City, Jos City, Kaduna North, Kano Municipal, Greater Port Harcourt, and Yola Municipality. Non-participant observation was adopted in some cases, using research assistants and telephone calls.

Twenty-five (25) in-depth interviews were also conducted that comprised both in-person and telephone conversations with the consumer rights advocates and electricity unions, energy consultants, experts and researchers across the federal universities in the sampled geo-political zones. In the Northeast and Northcentral states such as Adamawa, Kaduna and Kano, the researchers used intermediaries or third parties in some cases of extreme security situations to conduct and record

the interviews, using mobile devices. Because of the delicate nature of the study, the respondents' personal details were fully anonymised. All of the information and data collected for the study were described and analysed using a qualitative descriptive method.

Shaping and infraction of the cost-reflective tariff by the ruling elite

Nigeria's electricity industry is currently facing difficulties, partly due to the shaping and violation of the market tool. The creation of NERC, with a clear statutory design for the political nomination of key executives, is one of the important and deliberate policy developments in the NESI reforms. NERC was established by Section 34 of the EPSRA eight (8) years before privatization was concluded in the Nigeria's electricity sector. The section empowers the President to appoint the Commissioners, including the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the regulatory apparatus, subject to confirmation by the Senate. The Commissioners are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate (The Electricity Act, 2023). The logic for the regulatory design, according to the former Nigerian Minister of Power, Works, and Housing, Babatunde Fashola,

is to give the sector stability in governance, regulatory action, and institution building, while freeing up the Ministry to concentrate on policy, project coordination, and project completion (Anyagwu, 2017). In spite of the finesse intention to improve performance

through government appointment and oversight, this governmental influence has inadvertently obfuscated the impartiality of NERC, providing latitude for bureaucratic and political interference (Amadi, 2019; Sipasi, 2018). Table 3 illuminates this political interference.

Table 3: *Shaping and Infringement of the Electricity Cost-Reflective Tariff by the Ruling Elite*

Infraction	Description	Source
Political suspension of tariff hikes	In January 2021, the Minister of Power ordered NERC to halt a planned tariff adjustment, overriding regulatory independence.	BusinessDay Editorial (2024)
Populist reversal of approved tariffs	In April 2024, NERC raised Band A tariffs from ₦68/kWh to ₦225/kWh, but backlash forced reconsideration, showing elite sensitivity to political optics over market realities.	BusinessDay News (2024)
Subsidy-driven distortion	Governments maintained subsidies instead of enforcing cost-reflective tariffs, creating liquidity crises and discouraging investment.	African Journals Online (Nwangwu, 2019)
Elite-driven tariff politics	Tariff reforms stalled due to political bargaining and elite interests, deepening a ₦4 trillion sector debt and undermining reform sustainability.	The Guardian Nigeria (December, 15, 2025)
Failure to implement the legal framework	Despite laws mandating cost-reflective tariffs, ruling elites resisted implementation to avoid public backlash, prioritizing political survival over sector stability.	BusinessDay Opinion (June 9, 2025)

Note. Data extracted and synthesized by the authors from Nigerian Dailies

The data in Table 3 demonstrates that the Minister of Power has, over the years, henpecked and undermined NERC in the discharge of its responsibilities, one of which is tariff adjustment, thereby overriding its regulatory independence. By 2024, NERC tried to reassert its regulatory independence by increasing the Band A tariff independent of the state, but reconsidered the decision the moment political actors intervened. The Nigerian government still maintains a subsidy in contravention of the market principles. The overwhelming presence of the elite-driven tariff has also stalled reform sustainability. This has undermined the legal frameworks that established the cost-reflective tariff system. Reflecting on these contradictions, Sipasi (2018) observed that apart from infringing on the regulatory independence of NERC, it has also suffered from having its commissioners removed before the conclusion of their terms and has had to operate for a significant amount of time without a fully equipped board. This is not surprising when it is apparent that patronage, rather than the technical and financial capabilities of investors, was the primary driver of the electricity sector's

privatization (Albert et al., 2021; Isenyo, 2025). The NERC's structural predicament concisely resonates with the argument of Cook et al. (2004) when they noted that:

..., state regulation may flourish for a set of altogether different reasons unrelated to market failure or developmental needs. This set of reasons for the regulatory state is associated not with the promotion of the public good but with private advantage.

A group of energy experts confirmed the adverse impact of the structure in an interview¹. One of them stated that:

This Electricity Act's requirement that the ruling class appoints the key NERC administrators on a tenured basis has rather created the necessary flexibility for the political infractions and regulatory violations that have characterized the electricity market after privatisation.

The FG's 40 percent equity shares in the electricity assets and the N200 billion monthly subsidies have also contributed

to bolstering regulatory infraction³. The 50 percent electricity tariff reduction on 24 March 2015 for residential and business consumers in the build-up to the 2015 general elections was evident in the political infraction in the electricity market (Sipasi, 2018; PM News, 2015). Nigeria's general elections, which were set for 28 March 2015, featured fierce competition for the presidency from the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP), which was running for reelection, and the newly established All Progressives Congress (APC) (Omotola & Nyuykonge, 2015). To gain political advantage, the ruling elite ostensibly contrived the electricity tariff reduction (Sipasi, 2018; Amadi, 2019), leveraging substantially government initiative on maintaining low consumer prices and gradual price adjustments in the initial stages (from 2008 to 2011 and 2012 to 2017) of privatization (Otobo et al., 2023; Tosho & Ahmed, 2024). Notwithstanding, the government's failure to activate the Power Consumer Assistant Fund (PCAF) (Esiedesa, 2025), along with its predilection for subsidies (which averaged ₦75.04/kWh in 2024) (Business Day, 2025) and interference in the electricity market, suggests its complicity in the political motivations behind the tariff

reduction. This is because the NERC had worked to establish cost-reflective pricing as a viable, stable, and ruled-based energy market (Ogunleye, 2017; PM News, 2015). Thus, lowering electricity tariffs, 11 weeks after enacting the various rules involving a shift towards a cost-reflective tariff (Transition Stage Market) (Ogunleye, 2017) cast doubt on the sincerity of the ruling elite and credibility of NERC (Ogunleye, 2017; PM News, 2015).

The subsequent electricity tariff increases, such as a 45 percent rate rise on 1 February 2016, the service-based tariff (SBT) model introduced in 1 November 2020 and the latest tariff hike in 1 April 2024 for Band A customers (Business Day, 2025), meant to improve cost-reflective tariff and cost recovery have been met with stiff oppositions and backlashes owing to poor service delivery, regulatory integrity and accountability shades in the NESI (ChapiOdekina, 2024). For instance, in a motion on 30 April 2024, the Nigeria's House of Representatives ordered the NERC to halt implementation of 1 April 2023 300 percent tariff increment, questioning the legality and reasonableness of the procedure adopted by NERC in approving

the tariff increase (ChapiOdekina, 2024). Although DisCos revenues rose from N810bn to N1.132 trillion as a result of the tariff increase, customers under Band A pay higher bills without commensurate services (Ojoko, 2025). The adverse impact of macroeconomic factors like inflation and foreign exchange rates fluctuations and other variables such as increasing gas prices, transmission loss factor, energy theft etc have also constrained the cost-reflective tariff and cost recovery (KPMG, 2023; Ogunleye, 2017; George, 2024). Thus, the government's persistent failure to liberalize the power market through enhanced regulatory integrity has contributed in making cost recovery for electricity generation and distribution extremely difficult (Sipasi, 2018; Nwangwu, 2019; Akanonu, 2019). Aggregate cost collection losses from electricity tariff shortfall have increased to N4.8 trillion over a span of about nine years (Jeremiah, 2024). Anonymous interview conducted with an official of the Sahara Group, a global energy player in electricity generation and distribution value chains revealed that:

The electricity tariff set by the Nigeria's regulatory bodies is below the cost of generation

and distribution, which has reduced the amount of money coming into GenCos and DisCos. The electricity tariff is completely at odds with market ideals of cost-reflective tariffs necessary for ensuring that resources are allocated efficiently and service providers maintain their services⁴.

The average permitted end-use customer tariff in Nigeria is \$0.07 per kWh- ₦100.27/kWh (Oladipo, 2025), representing only 35.71 percent of the average \$0.19/kWh tariff that is charged in other West African nations like Niger, Benin, Togo, etc (Oladipo, 2025). Electricity tariff is of concern to the electricity market because pricing should achieve a delicate balance between the interests of investors and consumers (Ogunleye, 2017). Cost-reflective tariff is the lifeblood of the electricity market, driving service delivery and giving investors confidence regarding cost recovery. Thus, the political infraction and contravention of this critical market instrument of NESI has left the electricity market in Nigeria in suboptimal pricing and pricing uncertainty (Jeremiah, 2020;

Nnodim, 2022; Jeremiah, 2023; Akanonu, 2019).The pricing gap and fuzziness it created have engendered regulatory risk, discouraged private investment, limited infrastructural upgrade, escalating liquidity shortfalls across the electricity value chains.

Breakdown of long-term domestic and foreign investment, and liquidity predicament in the NESI

Liquidity is the oxygen of business. It is at the core of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. Because the energy market is capital-intensive, long-term domestic and foreign direct investments (FDI) are necessary for its expansion (Adelakun et al., 2025). FDI provides the needed capital, technology, and knowledge required in the electricity sector, fostering the development of local talents and innovations (Adelakun et al., 2025; Miraz & Soo, 2024; Liu et al., 2023). The introduction of market competition and incentives for FDI and domestic investment was among the key objectives of the privatization of NESI (Nwangwu, 2019; Ojoye, 2019; EPSRA, 2023).The implementation of SBT and measures for commercial incentives, such as tax reductions, was deemed necessary to draw-in and stimulate investments as

well as bolster liquidity (EPSRA, 2023; NERC, 2023). Because of political interference and regulatory risk, NESI since its privatization has attracted little private capital (Jeremiah, 2022; Nwangwu, 2019). In an anonymous interview, a public policy expert asserted that:

No investor will place funds in a high-risk industry. The politicisation of the electricity industry, which should have been governed by market pricing principles of demand and supply, has remained a key factor preventing foreign direct investment in the sector⁵.

This was confirmed by a group of electricity industry experts in another anonymous interview⁶. One respondent asserted that the main reason leading private investors rarely consider Nigeria's power sector is not a lack of capital but a crisis of accountability and transparency, arising from contradictory and unclear tariff regulations⁷. This scenario creates an environment of uncertainty, deterring potential investors who seek stable and predictable regulatory conditions for their ventures⁸.

Due to lack of investments from firms with access to foreign direct investment and technical partners, NESI has primarily relied on funding interventions from donor organizations, Nigerian governments, and other nations (Jeremiah, 2022; Centre for Democracy and Development, 2018; Okonkwo, 2022; Addeh, 2022). Thus, in addition to subsidy regime, budgetary and extra-budgetary expenditures, averaging N3.2 trillion from 2015 to 2023 (Jeremiah, 2024; Jeremiah, 2023; Aina, 2025), Nigeria received loans of \$2.3 billion and \$486 million from the German government under the Siemen's electricity deal as well as the World Bank, under the Nigeria Electricity Transmission Project (NETAP) respectively (Jeremiah, 2024). Also, the World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), Japan, France, and other financiers lent Nigeria over \$7.5 billion (Jeremiah, 2023). The Nigerian House of Representatives in 2017 disclosed that foreign loans to TCN totalled \$1.5bn (Jeremiah, 2023). The above interventions have yielded, at best, marginal improvements in liquidity, as evidenced by limited investment in infrastructure upgrades, poor energy generation, transmission, and distribution, and a precarious balance between energy demand and supply in

Nigeria (Jeremiah, 2024). The dominant influence of the ruling elite and the entanglement of politics in the electricity market have led to the mismanagement and misalignment of the above interventions⁹. An energy consultant contended in an anonymous interview that:

The funding interventions were not designed to align with the business goals of the GenCos, TCN, and DisCos, who will ultimately benefit from the interventions and are accountable for their efficient use to produce favorable outcomes¹⁰.

In an interview, an official of the Nigeria Consumer Protection Network stated that much cannot be achieved in terms of investment and liquidity, in an electricity market that is deliberately skewed to fail; a sector that lacks the requisite governance structure, fiscal discipline, and responsibility¹¹. According to the Nigerian Electricity System Operator, while Nigeria's installed generation capacity stands at over 13,000 MW, only about 4,500 MW is available on the grid in 2025 due to gas constraints, ageing infrastructure, and transmission

bottlenecks (cited in Business Day, 2025). The majority of generated and distributed power are grid-tied and primarily dependent on thermal gas (about 86% or about 4kWh of every 5kWh generated) and hydropower sources (14%) despite Nigeria's abundant energy potentials and growing demand for smart technology, renewable energy, and off-grid solutions (The Electricity Hub, 2021; Ajayi, 2018). Discos routinely reject power allocations because they lack the infrastructure to deliver electricity to end users (Business Day, 2025). The Discos are poorly funded and on the verge of bankruptcy (under-capitalized close to the tune of N2trn), with their companies being able to pay for only 30 per cent of the power they take (George, 2024, Obasi & Okafor, 2017; Ndujihe et al., 2024). Also, the transmission system is yet to be optimized (BudgIT, 2019).

Corrupt tariff regime, shadow economy, poor revenue generation and service delivery

A tariff is a critical mechanism of managing the electricity industry, enabling the recovery of production costs. A cost-reflective tariff system ensures that electricity companies maintain and upgrade their systems to provide reliable

service to consumers and encourage a more sustainable electricity market (Aina,2025).To foster cost-reflective tariff, the DisCos were committed to a contractual mandate at the time of privatisation to meter customers after five years (Aladeitan & Suanu- Deekae, 2020). This was to foster compliance with the calculation of consumers' monthly power bills using the average energy delivered to each class of customers and to improve on revenue collection (Aladeitan & Suanu- Deekae, 2020). As a result of regulatory gap, only 7.18 million of the 13.34 million registered customers were metered as at 29 April 2025, representing 53.85% of the customer base (Punch, 2025). The failure to meter customers enables Discos to resort to estimated billing (Business Day, 2025), leveraging substantially the Estimated Billing (MEB) methodology (Punch, 2018; Jeremiah, 2024; Muhammed, 2018). The MEB is a non-reflective tariff system approved by NERC on 1 August 2012 that requires customers to pay either far above or below electricity consumption since there is no accurate metering device to detect the actual electricity consumption even before privatization (Aladeitan & Suanu- Deekae, 2020). Generally, this billing system allows

DisCos to impose arbitrary charges on unmetered customers (Business Day, 2025), due to information asymmetry on metering data. The core argument of the DisCos has always been that tariffs must reflect the cost of service if the sector is to be sustainable (Business Day, 2025). The Punch newspaper in an editorial describes the estimated billing system as "ridiculous and crazy...a bill far higher than the electricity consumed" (The Punch, 2025). A group of electricity consumers interviewed across the sampled zones confirmed the corrupt estimated billing system¹². One of them stated that:

I am a public servant, and my family of five and I live in a three-bedroom apartment. In a week, we barely have electricity for more than three hours. We have been continuously served with estimated bills by NEPA that range from 25,000 to 30,000 naira. The landlord's attempts to persuade officials to put prepaid meters in the residence have not been successful as the officials are reluctant. Such expenditure is excessive and annoying¹³.

Because of NERC's laissez-fair posture and frailty in market regulations (Punch, 2018), the DisCos, in many cases, are able to get away with inflated invoicing (Nnodim, 2022; Jeremiah, 2023; Punch, 2025).

The DisCos' absolute neglect of the technical perspective of their business bordering on the upgrade of infrastructure and improvement on service delivery amidst outrageous bills is also a source of concern¹⁴. As a result of the nonchalant attitude of the DisCos, many consumers occasionally replace transformers, transformer oil, poles, meters, and cables; because if they refuse to do so, they will be left in darkness for months, as noted by an electricity consumer¹⁵. In the midst of frustration and apathy in estimated bill payments (Olawin, 2024), many businesses and households have stopped grumbling and started looking for ever-more-dramatic ways to cut costs (Punch, 2025; Jeremiah, 2023; Sesan, 2018). There is evidence of the existence of a flourishing shadow economy, as individuals and businesses attempt to obtain electricity outside of the established channels in an effort to save money (George, 2024). This underground market thrives on the

premise of lower costs, often at the expense of safety and legality (George, 2024). DisCos and NERC officials confirmed that the shadow economy is mostly fueled by extensive power theft, which includes tampering with metering systems and making unauthorized connections straight from utility poles¹⁶. It is a criminal act to use electricity without paying for it (George, 2024). Corrupt officials of the DisCos are often bribed to perpetrate this act and avoid paying the allotted bills (BusinessDay, 2016). The recent tariff hike on 1 April 2024, with marginal improvement in

power supply, has contributed to deepening the criminal act of power theft (Akpan et al., 2024; Aina, 2025). Although revenues of DisCos rose from N810billion to N1.132 trillion as a result of the tariff hike¹⁷, an estimated N21 billion is lost on average every year in the electricity sector as a result of energy theft (George, 2024). The DisCos reported a shortfall of more than N202 billion in revenue collection in the first quarter of 2025 alone, despite an increase in energy bills throughout Nigeria (Aina, 2025). Table 4 contains a clearer picture of the whole situation.

Table 4: *Shadow Economy, Poor Revenue Generation, and Poor Service Delivery*

Issue	Description of Infraction/Challenge	Source
Shadow economy practices	Widespread electricity theft, illegal connections, and bypassing of meters create a parallel shadow economy that erodes sector revenue.	African Journals Online (Nwangwu, 2025); Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission Reports
Poor revenue generation	Distribution companies (DisCos) collect less than 70% of billed revenue due to non-payment, corruption, and weak enforcement, leading to liquidity crises.	Nigerian Energy Support Programme (2015); BusinessDay News (2024)
Weak service delivery	Despite tariff increases, consumers face unreliable supply, frequent blackouts, and poor customer service, fueling distrust in reforms.	Obiorji and Iwuoha (2021); The Guardian Nigeria (2025)

Note. Information extracted and synthesized by the authors from Nigerian Dailies

The data in Table 4 show that the Nigerian electricity industry has witnessed different kinds of illegal connections and the bypassing of meters in measuring the amount of electricity consumption in Nigeria, thus creating a parallel shadow economy in the industry. According to the Energy Support Programme, due to payment evasion by electricity users, revenue remittances have suffered. It is, therefore, not surprising that consumers face a consistently unreliable power supply, thereby creating customers' distrust of the entire electricity reform regime.

An energy consultant interviewed claimed that this backdrop development explains the current DisCos' enormous liability, their inability to pay for electricity transmitted from GenCos, the problem of rejected electricity, and their increasing debt profile to GenCos¹⁸. There are now more concerns in the energy supply chain as a result of this predicament, and the overall stability of the electricity market is in jeopardy, prompting demands for immediate reforms to deal with the regulatory nuances and complexities in the industry.

Conclusion

Over a decade of privatization, Nigeria's electricity sector has repeatedly recorded miserable performance, with the country palpably fixated in an electricity predicament. The obstinate electricity predicament in Nigeria is a reflection of the infringement of the critical electricity market demand and supply tools by the political elite. The structural disorder of the regulatory authority, undergirded by political influences, has obscured its impartiality by granting the ruling class the leverage to nominate and oversee front-line officials, which in turn enabled significant political interference in the implementation of a cost-reflective tariff for the benefit of the politicians. Also, the government's equity shares in the electricity value chains, along with the subsidy regime, have contributed to regulatory infraction. This has ultimately embedded regulatory risk and electricity pricing fuzziness, precipitating the breakdown of long-term domestic and foreign investment, as well as liquidity. Because of the scarcity of capital from investors with access to foreign direct investment and technical partners, the electricity sector in Nigeria has primarily relied on funding interventions from donor organizations, Nigerian

governments, and other nations, which have reportedly been inadequate. The emergence of a corrupt tariff regime, the entrenchment of a shadow economy, poor revenue generation, cyclic indebtedness across the electricity value chains, and inefficient service delivery are all consequences of the deepening liquidity dilemma, rising debt profile of the electricity value chains, and information asymmetry on metering data. More worrisome has been a seeming gap in the arrest, trial, and prosecution of the

regulatory lawbreakers in the electricity industry. This has apparently jeopardized the overall stability of the electricity market and seemingly put Nigeria's electricity industry and privatization in a reverse gear. Absolute political will is generally needed in ensuring the complete privatization of the NESI and provision of sovereign guarantees and an impartial regulatory ecosystem necessary to attract private investment, upgrade of electricity infrastructure, and improvement of service delivery.

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Notes

1. Interview with 8 energy experts aged 40–65, Abuja, 20 April 2025
2. Interview with a 48-year-old energy expert, Abuja, 20 April 2025
3. Interview the Executive Coordinator of NEPA WAHALA NIG., Emeka Ojoko, Arise News Prime Time, 8:30pm, 25 August 2025
4. Interview with a 60-year-old official of Sahara Group, Ikeja, 15 May 2025
5. Interview with industry experts aged 45–70, Ikeja, 20 May 2025
6. Interview with 5 industry experts aged 45–70, Ikeja, 20 May 2025
7. Interview with a 56-year-old industry expert, University of Lagos, 25 May 2025
8. Interview with a 56-year-old industry expert, University of Benin, 30 May 2025

9. Interview with a 56-year-old industry expert, Benin, 30 May 2025
10. Interview with a 69-year-old energy consultant, Jos City, 16 June 2025
11. Interview with a 50-year-old official of Nigeria Consumer Protection Network, Kaduna, 4 July 2024
12. Interview with 9 electricity consumers aged 35–60, Port Harcourt, 15 July 2025
13. Interview 40-year-old electricity consumers Port Harcourt, 15 July 2025
14. Interview with a 65-year-old energy researcher, Ahmadu Bello University, 25 July 2025
15. Interview with a 40-year-old electricity consumer, Kano, 30 July 2025
16. Interview with 5 Discos and 7 NERC officials aged 40–60, Enugu, 5 August 2025
17. Interview the Executive Coordinator of NEPA WAHALA NIG., Emeka Ojoko, Arise News Prime Time, 8:30pm, 25 August 2025
18. Interview with a 65-year-old energy consultant, University of Nigeria, 5 August 2025

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